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Transferable Development Rights in New York City 
Brandon Boffard 
April 23, 2013  
INTRODUCTION 
 The transfer of development rights (TDR) is a municipal land use tool employed in New 
York City among other locations. It provides an effective and flexible technique for land use 
control. A TDR is regulation technique that can be used to ensure that the municipality's 
planning goals are met without causing an unfair financial burden to landowners or restricting 
needed development.
1
  A TDR works by permitting all or part of the unused development 
capacity of one tract of land to be transferred to a noncontiguous parcel or to land owned by 
another party.
2
  The unused development rights become a separate property right, which can then 
be sold to landowners who wish to add density to their lot.
3
  In essence, a TDR program involves 
attaching development rights to specified lands desired by a municipality to be kept undeveloped 
and allowing those rights to be transferred, so that development can occur in another location.
4
 
 The concept of transferring development rights between properties was first introduced in 
New York City through a zoning ordinance in 1916.
5
  It allowed landowners to sell their unused 
development rights to adjacent lots, which then could exceed the new height and setback 
requirements.
6
  Transferable development rights originally could only be completed through a 
zoning lot merger, which allowed transfers as-of-right (without the need for approval or 
                                                        
1 James A. Coon, Local Government Technical Series, Transfer of Development Rights 1-2, N.Y. ST. DEP’T OF ST., 
(2011). 
2 Id. at 6. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 7. 
5 Erica Pruetz & Rick Pruetz, Transfer of Development Rights Turns 40, 59 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3, 3 (2007). 
6 Id. 
2 
 
permitting) but only between adjacent properties.
7
  In 1968, New York City’s Landmark 
Preservation Law was enacted, allowing more flexible transfers across the street but subject to 
certain restrictions and approvals.
8
 Recognizing deficiencies with the two prior programs, the 
more modern conception of a TDR is through a program called a special transfer district. Special 
transfer programs allow transfers from specified granting zones to specified receiving zones, 
usually within the same neighborhood.
9
   
 This paper will explore the reason for the shift away from the traditional concepts of a 
transferable development right to the use of the more complex special transfer districts.  In 
particular, this paper will look at the features of the most recent Special West Chelsea District, 
the Theater Subdistrict, and the Hudson Yards District.  It will examine the beneficial features of 
these programs, which make them a more desirable land use tool than their predecessors. 
Moreover, it will examine the efficacy of each program and make policy recommendations for 
future TDR programs in New York City.  
 The first section, will examine the foundation and regulatory structure of New York 
City's TDR programs and explore critical distinctions amongst the programs. This review sets 
the stage for Parts II and III, which will examine the failures of the original conception of a 
transferable development right and the consequent shift towards the adoption of the Special 
Transfer District.  Part III, will look at the key features of the recent Special TDR Programs, and 
highlight the different advantages and disadvantages of each.  This paper will conclude by 
arguing for specific policy recommendations for development rights programs going forward. 
                                                        
7 Vicki Been & John Infranca, Transferable Developments Rights Programs: "Post" Zoning? 4, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (NYU Sch. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-50; NYU Law and Economics 
Research Paper No. 12-31, Sept. 11, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144808. 
8 James A. Coon, supra note 1, at 3. 
9 Been & Infranca, supra note 7, at 8. 
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I. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK CITY 
 In New York City there are three main types of transferable development rights 
programs. This section will examine the basic features of each type of program and give a 
historical perspective on how they came about.  
A. Zoning Lot Merger 
 A "zoning lot merger" is achieved by joining two or more adjacent zoning lots into one 
new zoning lot.
10
 Once the zoning lots are merged, the development rights from the merged lots 
are combined, allowing private owners to freely transfer bulk and density among their tax lots.
11
 
Zoning lot mergers are the most common means of transferring developments rights.  Private 
parties may accomplish a zoning merger "as-of-right," without the need for a special permit or 
other regulatory approval.
12
 As a result, the relative ease in the ability to complete the mergers, 
renders them more cost effective and less time-consuming than alternative methods of TDRs.
13
 
 The use of zoning lot mergers can be traced to the 1916 New York City Zoning 
Resolution that sought to restrict building size mainly through height restrictions and setback 
requirements. 
14
  However, these limitations only applied when a building occupied more than a 
quarter of the total lot. As a result, the limitations were vulnerable to interpretations that the total 
lot footage included any adjacent lots, even if the owners of those lots leased or sold their air 
                                                        
10 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 12-10 (2012) (zoning lot definition, subsection (d)). 
11 Norman Marcus, Air Rights in New York City: TDR, Zoning Lot Merger and the Well-Considered Plan, 50 
BROOK. L. REV. 867, 879 (1984). 
12 Been & Infranca, supra note 7, at 4. 
13 Marc A. Landis, Kevin B. McGrath, & Lonica L. Smith, Transferring Development Rights in New York City, N.Y. 
L.J., Sept. 29, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.phillipsnizer.com/pdf/Article-NYLJ-RE-TransDevRights-ML-
KMc-LS-9-29-08.pdf.  
14 Michael B. Kruse, Constructing the Special Theater Subdistrict: Culture, Politics, and Economics in the 
Creation of Transferable Development Rights, 40 URB. L. 91, 100 (2008). 
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rights to the building’s developers.15  In order to avoid height and setback requirements, property 
owners had an incentive to enlarge their lots by leasing or purchasing air rights. 
16
 
 In 1961 New York City enacted a resolution that applied the concept of floor to area ratio 
(FAR) as the primary land use control.  FAR, which is the predominate means of determining a 
building’s "bulk," "is the ratio of total building floor area to the area of its zoning lot."17  For 
example, a building on a 20,000 square foot zoning lot, in a zoning district with a maximum 
FAR of five, cannot exceed 100,000 square feet of floor area.  A zoning lot is a piece of land 
comprising a single tax lot or multiple adjacent tax lots within a block.
18
  If a zoning lot is 
coterminous with the owner's tax lot, the FAR must be used on that tax lot. When two zoning 
lots coterminous with two different tax lots are merged to become one zoning lot, the parties are 
able to freely transfer unused FAR, in terms of buildable square footage, between tax lots.
19
 
 When first introduced in 1961, the Zoning Resolution did not provide a specific 
development rights transfer mechanism. The then existing definition of a "zoning lot" allowed a 
developer to enter into a long-term lease of adjacent lots on the same city block and then 
purchase and allocate any unused development rights from one tax lot to another.
20
 The short-
term attempt to link contiguous tax lots with one another through long-term leases did not work. 
A long-term lease had to be at least fifty years in duration, which led to an increased likelihood 
that a lessee could default and the lessor would have to foreclose.
21
 This lead to uncertainties in 
the market for development rights, in response, the 1977 amendment to the Zoning Resolution 
                                                        
15 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING HANDBOOK, at 148 (2011).  
16 Kruse, supra note 19, at 100. 
17 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 12-10 (2006) (part (d) under definition of Zoning Lot). 
18 Id. 
19 Been & Infranca, supra note 7, at 4. 
20 Marcus, supra note 11, at 875-876. 
21 Been & Infranca, supra note 7, at 4 (citing Marcus, supra note 11, at 875-876). 
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eliminated the lease requirement, shoring up any uncertainties created in the use of development 
rights.
22
  The definition of "zoning lot" now includes "a tract of land consisting of two or more 
contiguous tax lots located on a single block, which, at the time of filing for a building permit or 
certificate of occupancy, is treated as one zoning lot for purposes of compliance with the Zoning 
Resolution."
23
  
 Even though private parties may accomplish a zoning merger "as-of-right," without the 
need for a special permit or other regulatory approval, there are still area specific zoning 
restrictions that must be complied with. For instance, in some zoning districts, the ability to use a 
zoning lot merger to increase buildable height, is limited by the requirement that the 
development occupy a minimum percentage of the merged lot.
24
 These restrictions are intended 
to avoid the development of buildings like Trump World Tower, which accumulated air rights 
from a number of merged lots to erect a tower that occupied a mere 13 percent of the merged 
lot.
25
  
B. Landmark Transfers 
 In 1968, the New York City Planning commission enacted a development rights transfer 
program for designated landmarks.  The regulation recognized that landmarks were endangered 
by the City's encouragement of builder friendly zoning initiatives coupled with continued 
pressures to develop.
26
 The new regulation sought to replace existing programs for landmark 
                                                        
22 David A. Richards, Downtown Growth Control Through Developments Rights Transfer, 21 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 435, 472 (1986). 
23 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 12-10 (2006). 
24 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 23-633(c)(3) (2011). 
25 David W. Dunlap, A Complex Plan's Aim: Simpler Zoning Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/30/realestate/a-complex-plan-s-aim-simpler-zoning-
rules.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.  
26 Note, Development Rights Transfer In New York City, 82 YALE L. J. 338, 350 (1972). 
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preservation, by allowing owners of designated landmark to transfer their unused building 
capacity to adjacent parcels for development. 
27
 The 1961 Zoning Resolution already permitted 
the transfer of potential development rights to a contiguous parcel, with the condition that both 
lots were under the same ownership. However, the law as it stood would render many landmarks 
useless, thus the 1968 amendment sought to remove many of these restrictions.
28
  The Zoning 
Commission broadened the definition of "contiguous" to include lots across the street or 
intersection from the landmark and by permitting transfers between separately owned zoning 
lots. 
29
  However, the ability to transfer development rights beyond the same block came with 
some limitation on how much the receiving site's FAR could be increased. The transferee lot was 
only permitted a twenty per cent increase in floor to area ratio through the transfer. 
30
 
 On its face, the Landmark Preservation Law appeared to be both aesthetically and fiscally 
well thought out. The Commission recognized that older buildings not only enhanced the city's 
character through their "historical associations and architectural distinction;" they also provided 
necessary avenues of light and air amid skyscrapers.
31
 The owners of designated landmarks 
would be compensated for their unused development rights; the buyers of these rights, in return, 
can acquire additional building capacity; the neighborhood, meanwhile, can retain an essential 
amenity, a revitalized landmark, as well as new developments in line with the character of the 
neighborhood; and the City, can benefit by way of new tax revenues from previously untaxable 
property.
32
 However, the new law was not without its challenges. 
                                                        
27 Note, Development Rights Transfer In New York City, 82 YALE L. J. 338, 350 (1972). 
28 Id. at 351. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 349. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. (citing  New York City Planning Commission, Minutes 303 (May 1, 1968).  
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 In 1978 the Supreme Court, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, first 
addressed a takings claim involving the landmark law.
33
 Under New York City's Landmark 
Preservation Law, Penn Central was prohibited from developing the air space above the terminal, 
but was given TDRs that would allow development of air space over surrounding properties.
34
  
Penn Central, alleged that the landmark regulation constituted an uncompensated taking, and that 
its TDRs were worthless to compensate for the restrictions imposed because no purchasers 
existed under the then-existing transfer rules.
35
 The Court held that Penn Central had not suffered 
an unconstitutional taking. However, the Landmark Preservation Commission did adopt two 
amendments to offset the marketability claims set forth by Penn Central. The first permitted the 
transfer of TDRs to "any site connected to the landmark through a chain of lots under common 
ownership."
36
 The second amendment removed the twenty-percent limit on the increase in FAR 
at a receiving site, but only for the highest-density commercial districts.
37
 
 Under Section 74-791 of the New York City Zoning Resolution, the owners of both 
landmark transfer sights and the receiving lots must submit an application to the City Planning 
Commission (CPC) for a permit to allow the transfer.
38
 In contrast to a zoning lot merger, which 
can be done as-of-right, the permit application is subject to New York City's Uniform Land Use 
Review Process (ULURP).  As part of the application the applicant must submit a site plan of the 
granting landmark lot and receiving lot, comprehensive plans for development, a program for 
continuing maintenance of the landmark, a report from the Landmarks Preservation Commission, 
                                                        
33 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
34 Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed 
to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459, 461-465 (1999). 
35 Kruse, supra note 19, at 102. 
36 Id.; see also Richards, supra note 22, at 451. 
37 Richards, supra note 22, at 451. 
38 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 74-791. 
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and any other information required by the CPC. 
39
 This process can be very costly and time-
consuming in comparison to the zoning lot merger. 
C. Special Transfer Districts 
 The litigation over Grand Central Terminal's development rights and the complexity 
involved in the Landmark Preservation Law, led to the development of a new approach to TDRs, 
called Special Transfer Districts. A special transfer district is a geographic area where contiguity 
requirements are eliminated and eligible granting districts are able to transfer development rights 
to specified eligible receiving lots, without the need for the lots to be adjoining.
40
 These 
programs are more narrowly tailored to achieve specific zoning goals and in theory expand the 
market for both potential buyers and sellers of TDRs. This relatively new breed of development 
rights was designed to alleviate the rigidity of zoning by allowing more distant transfers, and to 
strengthen the market for TDRs.
41
 
 In its most basic form, a "sending district" is defined as one or more designated districts 
or areas of land in which development rights may be transferred.
42
  On the other hand, a 
"receiving district," is defined as one or more designated areas of land to which unused 
development rights from sending districts may be transferred, to increase development by reason 
of the transfer.
43
 The designation of "sending districts" and "receiving districts" is enacted as part 
of the municipal zoning regulations. This requires that the designation of these reciprocal 
                                                        
39 Vicki Been, John Infranca, & Josiah Madar, The Market for TDRs in New York City 14-17(Nov. 1, 2012)  
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review). 
40 Id. at 14. 
41 Id. 
42 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 91-60 (2004). 
43 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 98-31 (1998). 
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districts will be established according to a comprehensive planning process, which requires the 
overall land use policy to be in the best interests of the community.
44
  
 The statutory language granting authority for special transfer districts is very broad, 
underscoring the importance and forethought required in the development of these sending and 
receiving districts. In particular, careful analysis must be taken in the designation of the zones for 
numerous reasons. First, there needs to be a market for development rights in the receiving 
district.
45
 This requires willing participants to buy and sell unused development capacity, usually 
with backstops to correct any market inefficiencies. For instance, a well thought out plan will 
usually include the use of a TDR bank or development fund.
46
 Next, the transfer will result in the 
increase in density or intensity of development in the receiving zone, which requires municipal 
resources to support it.
47
 For example, there needs to be adequate transportation, water supply, 
waste disposal, and fire protection.
48
  Consequently, an environmental impact statement must be 
prepared for the receiving district in order to account for the potential impact of such 
development. 
49
 
  Furthermore, Special Transfer Districts must be carefully thought out to account for 
overlays of existing zoning plans. Zoning districts need not be coterminous with each other, 
therefore sending and receiving districts may overlap in some instances. Specificity is needed in 
drafting these new zoning requirements, to understand how existing zoning districts will interact 
                                                        
44 James Coon, supra note 1, at 6. 
45 Sarah J. Stevenson, Banking on TDRs: The Government's Role as Banker of Transferable Development Rights, 
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1329, 1331 (1998).  
46 TDR banks were created to counter some of the difficulties proposed by the use of TDRs. By acting as a 
middleman between buyer and seller, TDR banks fill a critical timing gap that could be the downfall of a TDR 
program. Government operated TDR banks resolve valuation and marketability problems by setting 
minimum purchase prices, guaranteeing loans that use TDRs as collateral, and purchasing TDRs outright. See 
Stevenson, supra note 45. 
47 James Coon, supra note 1, at 7. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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with pre-existing districts.
50
 Lastly, in considering the development of sending and receiving 
districts, the legislature must evaluate the impact of development on low income housing.
51
 
There must be a showing of "appropriate equivalence" between lost opportunities for such 
housing in the sending district and gained opportunities in the receiving district.
52
 
 In New York City, the most recognizable special transfer districts include, the South 
Street Seaport Subdistrict, the Theater Subdistrict, the Special West Chelsea District, and the 
Hudson Yards District.
53
 Each of these programs represents a complex TDR program, which 
reflects the City's evolving efforts to encourage development in targeted locations.  
II.   PROBLEMATIC DESIGN OF THE ORIGINAL TDR PROGRAMS 
 The use of Transferable Development Rights is an evolving and imperfect land use tool. 
In practice, the use of TDRs has been widely accepted by land use planners, market participants, 
and regulatory bodies alike.
54
  Despite their broad application, TDRs are susceptible to numerous  
issues associated with transferability, rigidity, marketability, and other costs that reduce their 
efficacy. 
55
 By exploring the purposes underlying the design of the particular TDR programs in 
New York City, and by exploring the various criticisms of each, this section will help to provide 
a framework to understanding the municipalities need to development a better TDR scheme.  
 A. The Failure of Landmark TDRs 
 The Landmark Zoning Law was a perfect example of what works well in theory may not 
work well in practice.  When properties are tagged as landmarks, property owners are allowed to 
                                                        
50 James Coon, supra note 1, at 7. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 91-60 (2004). 
54 Vicki Been, John Infranca, & Josiah Madar, supra note 39, at 25. 
55 Id. at 32. 
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transfer the authorized unused development capacity of their landmarks to adjacent lots, subject 
to certain restrictions.
56
 In return, the city has the ability to preserve community resources in a 
cost effective way.  In the case of Penn Central, the court found the use of TDRs as just 
compensation to survive a regulatory takings challenge.
57
 This market-based mechanism for 
allocating development rights achieves resource protection more efficiently. It effectively allows 
municipalities to pass off the costs of landmark preservation to market participants, who can now 
afford them through the creation of valuable unused property rights.
58
 At the same time, the 
municipalities avoid the obligation to compensate landowners for the deprivation of the market 
value of their property.
59
 However, the plan has many shortcomings in practice. 
 First, in order to obtain approval for a transfer, the New York Landmark Commission 
requires extensive plans to determine whether the materials, plans, design, and scale are 
compatible with the landmark.
60
 Next, the owners of the landmark and the transferee must appear 
before the New York Planning Commission for preliminary approval of the transfer.
61
 
Accompanying this application, site plans for both the sending and receiving lots with a detailed 
program for continuing maintenance of the landmark, and a report of the Landmark commission 
detailing the effect of the proposed transfer upon the landmark are required.
62
 If the Planning 
Commission makes a recommendation, the application then goes before the Board of Estimate, 
which has final authority to grant or deny the application.
63
 
                                                        
56 John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 574, 585 (1972). 
57 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
58 Andrew J. Miller, supra note 34, at 468. 
59 Id. at 470. 
60 John J. Constonis, supra note 56, at 586. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 588. 
63 Id. at 589. 
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 The level of bureaucracy involved in the landmark transfer approval process is the first of 
many pitfalls for this TDR program. On the one hand, zoning lot mergers can be made as-of-
right, while the landmark transfer program, although similar, provided no such advantage. 
Additionally, by limiting development rights transfers to adjacent lots, the program creates a 
serious restraint on marketability.
64
 Existing zoning schemes, such as the zoning lot merger, 
already permitted developers to shift unused development potential to contiguous parcels.
65
 
Therefore, the plan is only useful in the rare instance where a developer happens to own a lot 
across a street or an intersection from a landmark.
66
 Similar to the zoning lot merger, this 
restraint on transferability is a serious downfall, without the added benefit of an optional as-of-
right merger. Additionally, the market value of the transfer rights is controlled solely by the 
variability of construction activity within the immediate vicinity of the landmark.
67
 Thus, the 
value of the transferable rights may be worthless if no construction is contemplated. This also 
leads to financial uncertainty, since there is no way to predict the cash flow from the transfer of 
these rights, which makes the evaluation of the economic burden of landmark ownership an 
unknown.
68
 
 In 1972, John Costonis came up with the "Chicago Plan," which was a response to the 
perceived deficiencies with the New York Landmark Preservation law. In his article, Costonis 
pointed out that no developers had made use of the landmark TDR programs four years earlier, 
citing the "inadequate analysis of the economic burdens of landmark ownership," "onerous 
administrative controls of dubious necessity," and the failure to "adequately insure that 
                                                        
64 Costonis, supra note 56, at 578. 
65 See John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L. J. 75,  (1973).  
66 Id. at 86. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 89. 
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landmarks of participating landowners will in fact be preserved."
69
 Most importantly, Costonis 
attributed the adjacency requirement as the key factor for the failure of the landmark TDR 
program. 
70
 Although Costonis's Chicago Plan was never adopted in Chicago, his ideas regarding 
a better way to preserve urban landmarks, are strikingly similar to New York City's special 
transfer districts TDR program that was later adopted. 
B. The Need for Special Transfer Districts 
 The Special Transfer District program was developed in response to the many 
shortcomings of New York City's Landmark TDR program.  The adjacency requirement, which 
severely diminished the marketability of the landmark’s development rights, was the principal 
reason it failed to win support by the real estate industry and landmark owners. 
71
 Development 
capacity was loosely dispersed throughout the city on the arbitrary principle of how closely 
landmarks are in relation to development zones.
72
 The emergence of the special transfer district, 
like the Chicago Plan, dispensed with the problematic adjacency requirement by permitting 
transfers to any property within the development rights transfer district in which the landmark is 
located.
73
 
 The development of the special transfer districts also provided other significant benefits 
over the more primitive TDR schemes.  By establishing a plan whereby unused development 
potential could be transferred across town to specifically designated receiving areas, the rigidity 
associated with other plans was effectively reduced.
74
 In turn, the marketability of these rights 
                                                        
69 Been & Infranca, supra note 7, at 14.(citing Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 56, at 622-623). 
70 Costonis, supra Note 56, at 622-623. 
71 Id. 
72 Been & Infranca, supra note 7, at 15.(citing Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 56, at 622-623). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 17. 
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were effectively increased, earning favor with prospective TDR grantors in large part because of 
the increased flexibility. These special programs also addressed concerns expressed by Costonis 
over the "capricious scattering of density around the city," since the proximity of a proposed 
development would only be in relation to a source of TDRs.
75
 However, the drawing of 
boundaries that were sufficiently thought out to benefit neighborhoods in need of lower density 
corrected this hazard. 
76
 
 The implementation of special transfer districts represents a significant improvement over 
the landmark transfer program. However, they are still an imperfect tool. As Vicki Been pointed 
out recently in her comprehensive study of what she called the "post zoning" era of TDRs in 
New York City, the complexity involved in sub-districting threatens to undermine the flexibility 
that TDRs are meant to provide.
77
 Essentially what she is getting at, is that stated purpose behind 
the special transfer districts are more arbitrary than say a landmark preservation program. This 
lack of clarity combined with the municipality requirements that are narrowly tailored to each 
specific plan, threatens the predictability and ease in which they can be utilized.  
 Additionally, approval of a transfer from a sending to a receiving zone by a zoning body 
is often a prerequisite to a final sale.
78
 These transactions are usually time consuming and costly. 
The local zoning body usually requires transactions to be duly recorded with the municipality 
that monitors these transactions.
79
 Another significant issue with special transfer districts is one 
of timing and speculative valuation. The transaction costs can be high for both buyers and sellers 
                                                        
75 Been & Infranca, supra note 7, at 15-18 (citing Costonis, The Chicago Plan, supra note 56, at 622-623). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Stevenson, Banking on TDRs, supra note 45, at 1359-1362. 
79 Id. 
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that are at the mercy of administrative efficiency.
80
 Municipalities must determine how to 
allocate the TDRs, approve appropriate parties, and record the transactions.
81
 On the other hand, 
landowners must find buyers for their TDRs, engage in negotiations over valuation, and prepare 
compliance documents.
82
  
III. NEW YORK CITY'S MOST RECENT TDR PROGRAMS 
 In New York City, the most recognizable special transfer districts include, the South 
Street Seaport Subdistrict, the Theater Subdistrict, the Special West Chelsea District, and the 
Hudson Yards District.
83
 By analyzing some of the key features of these programs and the 
evolution of the City's use of these TDRs, we can understand what attributes of the existing plans 
are successful.  
A. Special TDR Programs 
 South Street Seaport 
 New York City enacted its first special TDR program in 1972, to preserve several blocks 
of historic, two-hundred-year-old buildings in an area directly south of the Brooklyn Bridge.
84
 
This area, surrounding the Fulton Street Fish Market was prime for development due to the rising 
land values in Manhattan.
85
  Recognizing the historic nature of the neighborhood, the City 
enacted a special transfer district in order to accomplish both preservation and development 
                                                        
80 Stevenson, Banking on TDRs, supra note 45, at 1359-1362. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLAN., ZONING RES. § 91-60. 
84 Stevenson, supra note 45, at 1345-1347. 
85 Id. 
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goals.
86
  The owners of historic properties in the preservation areas (sending districts) were 
allowed to convey their development rights to either a middleman or directly to a receiving lot.
87
 
 A key feature of the South Street Seaport program was the use of TDR Banks. The TDR 
banks were third party intermediaries, comprised mainly of commercial banks, that held existing 
mortgages on the historic buildings and facilitated a market for these TDRs.
88
 The use of the 
TDR banks was instrumental to the City's plan, by providing historic buildings immediate 
financial relief, without the timing issues related to other zoning plans.
89
  Property owners who 
had buyers at the outset of the program could sell those rights directly; those that could not sold 
their rights to the TDR banks.
90
  This arrangement facilitated a market for the owners of the 
development rights, since the banks essentially freed owners of the landmark buildings of their 
mortgage debt in exchange for the TDRs.
91
 When the banks sold the development rights, they 
usually recouped a return on their investment making it beneficial for both parties involved. 
92
 
 The South Street Seaport TDR program was considered a success. The majority of 
participating banks made a profit on the TDRs they sold, and the program accomplished its goals 
of preserving and developing its participating lots.
93
  
 Theater Subdistrict 
 The Theater Subdistrict was created pursuant to the 1998 zoning regulation to preserve 
and enhance the cultural, theatrical and entertainment showcase in the area known as the theater 
                                                        
86 Stevenson, supra note 45, at 1344. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1346 
89 Joseph Stinson, Transferring Development Rights: Purpose, Problems, and Prospectus in New York, 17 Pace L. 
Rev. 319, 340 (1996). 
90 Id. at 330. 
91 Id. 
92 Stevenson, supra note 45, at 1344. 
93 Id. 
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district.
94
  As part of the plan, forty-six specifically listed theaters were allowed to transfer 
unused development rights to any other lot within the Theater Subdistrict.
95
 In order to execute a 
transfer, the owner of a granting site must provide written assurances that the site will continue 
to be used as a theater, and the City Planning Commission must issue a certification.
96
  The 
theater must also be certified as physically and operationally sound, or a plan must be proposed 
to comply with the requirements for continued use.
97
  
 The Theater Subdistrict TDR program allowed development rights to be transferred 
anywhere within the Theater Subdistrict, subject to a FAR limitation.
98
 Transfer through a 
certification would only be allowed in cases where the floor to area ratio at the receiving site was 
increased by no more than twenty percent.  However, receiving sites within the Eighth Avenue 
Corridor (designated area along eighth avenue in midtown) may use the TDRs to gain an 
additional twenty percent of FAR above that allowed by certification, subject to a discretionary 
allowance by the City Planning Commission.
99
  Another unique feature of this program was the 
mandatory contribution to the Theater Subdistrict Fund, which is used to finance inspection and 
maintenance of the granting theaters.
100
 
 To date, of the 46 specifically listed theaters in the Theater Subdistrict, only eleven 
transfers have take place through the Theater Subdistrict TDR program.
101
 Whether this program 
can be considered a success is relative. According to a comprehensive set of data compiled by 
the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, between 2003 and 2011, only two transfers 
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occurred through the landmark TDR program, compared to eleven transfers through the Theater 
transfer program and seventeen made use of the West Chelsea Program.
102
 One of the 
distinguishing factors that can account for the disparity between the landmark transfer program 
and the theater subdistrict program, is the transaction costs involved. While the landmark TDR 
program requires a special permit for all transfers, the Theater Subdistrict program, only requires 
authorization from the City for transfers that increase the FAR at the recipient site more than 
20%.
103
  Similar to as-of-right zoning lot mergers, market participants prefer having the means of 
transferring development rights with lower transactions costs. 
  On the other hand, the disparity between the Theater Subdistrict and the Special West 
Chelsea District, which will be discussed in more detail below, can be attributed to the 
predictability involved.
104
 In Theater Subdistrict Program, development rights can be transferred 
to anywhere within the theater subdistrict.
105
 Therefore, the predictability of the increased 
density at any specific site is uncertain, making it difficult for stakeholders to understand the net 
effect of the proposed rezoning. However, the inclusion of an improvement fund, which is 
involved in the Special Theater, Hudson Yards, and Special West Chelsea District, is an 
additional cost but one that is standardized and thus attributes to predictability.
106
 An 
improvement fund is a fund that takes contributions by participants in a given program and uses 
the proceeds to offset the impact of the development on a given area. In some instances, the use 
of a fund is required, while in other times it is a flexible device whereby developers who have 
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exceeded the maximum allowable FAR, can make a contribution to obtain additional building 
capacity.
107
  
 Special West Chelsea District 
 The Special West Chelsea District is the area bounded by Tenth and Eleventh Avenues 
from West 30th Street south to West 16th Street.
108
  After the High Line rail train discontinued 
service in 1980, the area between 10th and 11th avenues consisted of decaying buildings and 
overgrowth of flowers and grass.
109
  In 2001, the city began efforts to develop the Special West 
Chelsea District. It sought to provide renewed residential and commercial development, facilitate 
the former High Line rail as an open space, and enhance the neighborhood's thriving art gallery 
district.
110
 
 As part of the plan, regulation restricted development of properties immediately west of 
the High Line, known as the "High Line Transfer Corridor."
111
  The owners of property in this 
corridor were allowed to transfer their TDRs to designated subareas.
112
  The Special West 
Chelsea District was a complex development plan that allowed receiving sites to increase their 
FAR between 1.0 and 2.65 depending on the particular subarea.
113
  In some instances, developers 
could increase their FAR by contributing to a High Line Improvement Fund or by participation 
in New York City's Inclusionary Housing Program. 
114
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 The Special West Chelsea program had several other distinct features.  For instance, 
eligibility to transfer a TDR required the dedication of an easement for an elevator or stairwell to 
provide access to the corridor.
115
 Additionally, the program provided alternatives to sites that 
remained vacant due to the transfer of all of their development capacity.
116
  Contribution to the 
High Line Improvement Fund allowed properties owners to purchase additional FAR.
117
  
However, the FAR was limited to use for a commercial purpose within the High Line 
Corridor.
118
   
 The Special West Chelsea TDR Program has been successful for the most part, due to its 
narrowly tailored plan to achieve its goals in revitalizing the High Line Corridor.  It provides 
flexibility for property owners by creating several avenues for increasing FAR. However, the 
program is not without its faults. Purchasers have complained that the number of TDRs are 
limited and that sellers priced their TDRs to high.
119
 Additionally, participants complained that 
the program's regulations were costly and should have created an easier means to conduct 
transfers.
120
    
 Special Hudson Yards District 
 The Special Hudson Yards district is the most recent development transfer program in 
New York. It was adopted by the City Council in 2005, and is not projected to be completed for 
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at least another decade.
121
 According to the New York City Department of City Planning, the 
Hudson Yards development was created in response to the rising demand for housing and office 
space in Manhattan.
122
 It is anticipated that there will be an influx of 440,000 new workers, 
requiring an additional 111 million square feet of space to accommodate this additional demand 
by 2025.
123
 Hudson Yards is considered one of the last underdeveloped areas in Manhattan, 
composed of the area bounded by West 42nd Street, Eighth Avenue to the Hudson River.
124
 The 
mission statement of this development is to provide additional job opportunities and housing in 
the area.
125
 
 The Hudson Yards development project is one of the most complex TDR schemes to 
date.  It is divided into multiple phases to account for the different initiatives involved in the 
plan.
126
  For example, Phase 2, seeks to obtain land for a public boulevard and park, while 
another seeks to direct commercial and residential development in specially allocated areas.
127
 
"Phase 2 Hudson Boulevard and Park," allows private owners of property restricted in this area, 
to transfer unused development rights by certification to designated subareas within the 
district.
128
  The prices for these TDRs are established through private transactions.
129
 Similar to 
the Special West Chelsea District, developers have the option to purchase TDRs privately or 
make a contribution to the to the Hudson Yards District Improvement Fund to receive a bonus.
130
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 Additional features of this program that are worth mentioning include the restriction on 
the maximum increase of FAR, nearly identical to the Special West Chelsea District.
131
 Another 
similarity exists, by means of an alternative to purchasing additional development rights, when 
FAR is maxed out.  In the Hudson Yards program, developers who have maxed out their 
permitted floor area can purchase additional rights from the Eastern Rail Yard.
132
  However, a 
developer must apply for these additional rights, and the price is set at sixty percent of the 
appraised value per square foot of the receiving parcel.
133
 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 The Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at New York University recently 
compiled one of the most complete data sets involving development rights transfers in New York 
City.  The research study analyzed 410 total development rights transfers in New York City 
between the period of January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2011. 
134
 The study produced some 
interesting findings with regard to the preferred mechanisms for transferring development rights 
in New York City and the effectiveness of these TDR programs.  The research showed that of the 
410 transactions that occurred between this period, the vast majority, 320 transaction, were arms-
length zoning lot mergers between unrelated parties.
135
 Fifty-seven transactions were zoning lot 
mergers between related parties and eleven transfers occurred via the Special Theater Subdistrict 
program.
136
 Additionally, seventeen transfers occurred through the West Chelsea District 
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Program, two through the Landmark Transfer Program, and four others by unspecified special 
transfer mechanisms.
137
 
 The data compiled by the Furman Institute, coupled with an understanding of the basic 
features of the various TDR programs, brings to light some significant findings.  First, 
developers prefer methods of transferring development rights that involve less regulatory 
compliance and in turn, less expense. According to the Furman Center study, the overwhelming 
majority of transactions occurred through arms-length zoning lot mergers, which can be done as-
of-right, without any special permitting and regulatory compliance.
138
  The as-of-right merger is 
a beneficial feature since it reduces the time and costs associated with compliance measures, 
which appear to dissuade developers from using them all together. This idea is reinforced by the 
data comparing the use of landmark TDR Program's to other programs. The landmark TDR 
program has only been utilized twice over the eight year period of the study, as opposed to 320 
times with the zoning lot merger, and 28 by way of Special Transfer Districts.
139
  This 
discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that the Landmark program requires a special permit for 
all transfers, while the Theater Subdistrict program only requires a permit in limited 
circumstances, and the zoning lot merger requires no approval at all.
140
 
 Recently, Special Transfer TDR programs in New York have substantially reduced the 
circumstances where regulatory approval is required to complete a transfer. In turn, there has 
been a corresponding increase in the number of transactions occurring by way of these newer 
programs.
141
 In fact, some special transfer programs such as the Special Theater Subdistrict, 
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allow zoning lot mergers to occur in designated areas of the districts without the need for special 
permitting. This allows developers to freely select the location and intensity of their 
developments throughout the district.
142
 From a policy perspective, it seems logical to assume 
that programs allowing a combination of transferring density by way of special TDRs, while 
including the beneficial tool of an as-of-right merger, would win favor with developers.  
 Analysis of the data also suggests that TDR programs that increase predictability and 
transparency, are correlated with an increase in the volume of TDR transactions. A key feature of 
the more recent Special Transfer Districts, is the more careful planning and exact allocation of 
development rights to particular lots.
143
 The newer TDR programs are more carefully planned 
out at a district-wide level, and therefore landowners can predict the effect of the zoning on 
particular lots.  Unlike, the Theater Subdistrict, where density could be arbitrarily dispersed 
throughout the district, the newer TDR programs create a more "harmonious relationship of new 
developments to nearby structures and open space."
144
 The developers can better predict how 
density will be dispersed throughout the district, which helps facilitate a more cohesive program. 
However, the more careful planning of these zoning districts runs the risk of adding complexity 
to the programs, which can correlate to higher compliance expenses. A well thought out program 
needs to not only account for predictability and transparency, but a way to offset rigidity. 
 A successful TDR program must also be flexible.  The newer special transfer district 
programs have certain flexibility features that strengthen the demand for TDRs and increase 
participation in these programs.  For example, special transfer districts include inclusionary 
housing bonus programs whereby a developer who has exceeded the maximum allowable FAR 
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can obtain additional building capacity by contributing to a fund.
145
 To better strengthen the 
market for these TDRs, a developer must initially purchase their TDRs from the private market 
before getting any additional allowances by the city.
146
  The ability to obtain additional FAR 
through a discretionary grant of permission, adds to flexibility of these programs.  It gives 
developers an alternative when their projects would otherwise be stalled by not having any 
additional building capacity. Moreover, by requiring developers to first purchase from the private 
market, or by creating a TDR Bank, these newer TDR programs strengthen the market for TDRs 
and render the programs much more effective.   
CONCLUSION 
 The rules and regulations pertaining to transferable development rights are often detailed 
and complex. New York City's Municipalities are constantly reinventing their land use policies 
and agendas to adapt to the many variables that weigh on their decision-making. To add to the 
confusion, there is no uniformity on how these transactions are recorded, and the implementation 
of transferable development rights programs are notoriously difficult to map. The approval of 
these programs usually take place over a number of years and the effectiveness of these 
programs are not known, in some instances, until decades later. This paper, by no means, is an 
attempt to completely understand a land use tool in which only a hand full of land use experts 
fully understand. Rather, it is meant to serve as an overview of the evolution and implementation 
of a land use tool that has helped shape the landscape of arguably one of the greatest cities in the 
world. 
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 With the above in mind, there are a few ideas that can conclude the focus of this paper. 
Developers prefer transferable development rights transactions that reduce regulatory 
compliance, create less expense, foster less uncertainty, and that are less time consuming.  The 
research by the Furman Institute showing the transactions between 2003 and 2011, reinforces 
this idea, since zoning lot mergers, which can be done "as-of-right", are the predominant method 
of transferring unused capacity.  Moreover, the newer special transfer districts were utilized 
more than the traditional landmark transfer program, due to the increased predictability and 
transparency of these programs. Programs that increase the predictability of which parcels have 
development rights for sale, which development sites can increase FAR, and what types of 
transfer will be allowed- are correlated with increase in both volume of the TDR transactions and 
price paid for development rights. Going forward, municipalities need to avoid a one-size fits all 
approach to implementing transferable development rights programs.  Successful programs will  
ultimately depend on a narrowly-tailored plan, that incorporates a combination of features from 
several types of these existing programs, while being careful to avoid any unnecessary rigidity.  
 
 
